Ideology in the age of mediatised politics: from ‘belief systems’ to the re-contextualizing principle of discourse by Kissas, Angelos
  
Angelos Kissas 
Ideology in the age of mediatised politics: 
from ‘belief systems’ to the re-
contextualizing principle of discourse 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Kissas, Angelos (2017) Ideology in the age of mediatised politics: from ‘belief systems’ to the re-
contextualizing principle of discourse. Journal of Political Ideologies, 22 (2). pp. 197-215. ISSN 
1356-9317 
DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2017.1306958 
 
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/76952/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Ideology in the age of mediatised politics: 
From ‘belief systems’ to the re-contextualizing principle of discourse 
 
Angelos Kissas, Department of Media and Communications,  
London School of Economics and Political Science  
a.kissas@lse.ac.uk  
 
To cite this article: Kissas, A. (2017) Ideology in the age of mediatized politics: from ‘belief 
systems’ to the re-contextualizing principle of discourse. Journal of Political Ideologies, 
22(2): 197-215. doi: 10.1080/13569317.2017.1306958  
 
Abstract  
Mediatized politics is often associated with a metamorphosis of politics; a shift from 
philosophical fermentations to effective media campaigning and from rational argumentation 
to personal appeals, sound-bites and dramatic effects. The question this article raises is whether 
this alleged metamorphosis allows some space for ideology to emerge and play any role in 
contemporary politics and, if so, what the implications for the study of political ideology in the 
age of mediatization are?  As I will argue, to study ideology in the context of mediatized politics 
is not to make big claims about the survival or demise of some ‘grand’ belief systems but to 
analytically address the potential of political discourse, as it is articulated through several 
media genres within specific socio-political contexts, to re-contextualize symbolisms from the 
past serving the effective exercise of political power in the present. I will further illustrate this 
attempted revisionism by briefly examining three televised political advertisements, which I 
take as an example of mediatized politics, by the American Democratic Party for the 2008 
presidential election in the US, by the British Conservative party for the 2010 general election 
in the UK and by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement for the 2009 parliamentary election in 
Greece, respectively. 
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Introduction 
This article has a dual goal: it argues that mediatized politics, albeit pragmatically driven and 
aesthetically/emotionally ridden1, may be still ideological; and, by virtue of doing so, it makes 
the claim that ideological politics in the age of mediatization can no longer be studied while 
taking for granted the essentialist conceptions with which ideology has been, extensively, 
bestowed so far. I particularly refer here to the conception of ideology, widely popular and 
influential in political theory and science, as rational sets of ideas, with closed and rigid 
structures, that articulate a normative view of politics and its relation to the society (what 
society has to look like and how politics can contribute to the realization of this ideal); a 
conception that is often, for the sake of brevity, referred as ‘belief systems’2. 
The mediatization of politics, as I will argue in the first part of this article, appertains to a 
metamorphosis of political discourse (personalization, conversationalization, dramatization) 
which, albeit overstated and often misinterpreted, is quite far from the Enlightenment ideal of 
‘proper’ political discourse (abstraction, raison d'être, purity)3, Ideology, however, has been 
linked to this essentialist concern about rationality and consistency in political discourse as 
much as it has been linked to the pragmatic concern about the effective exercise of power 
through political discourse4. As Sartori has succinctly put it ‘this is, it seems to me, the single 
major reason that ideology is so important to us. We are concerned about ideologies because 
we are concerned, in the final analysis, with the power of man over man, with how populations 
and nations can be mobilized and manipulated […]’5. From this point of view, mediatized 
politics could be intrinsically ideological since media are said to constitute the primary locus 
where political power is symbolically claimed and contested in late modern societies6.  
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It is, however, the personal appeals, sound-bites and dramatic effects rather than the rational 
belief systems that symbolically facilitate the exercise of power through the media7. By this 
token, the following dilemma seems to emerge: what weighs more as ‘ideological’ in 
contemporary politics: the adherence to belief systems developed at some point in history – 
particularly, those that emerged in the late eighteenth and that, in the course of the nineteenth 
century, were subsequently acclaimed as the ‘grand narratives’ that shaped politics in the 
twentieth century, such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, communism, etc.8 – or the use 
of any symbolic form in so far us it is oriented at serving the exercise of power?9  
As I will illustrate in greater depth in the second and third parts of this article, this is a pseudo-
dilemma as it is not particular (rationalist and cohesive or bombastic and dissimulative) ideas 
that are implanted with the privilege of enacting certain patterns of political (self)representation 
and mobilizing certain forms of political action but, generally, the historicity of discourse, by 
virtue of its re-contextualizing principle. Discourse, by appropriating and realigning different 
ideas, concepts and practices of symbolic meaning from the past, within specific socio-
institutional contexts, gives rise to new regimes of meaning, and in doing so, it (re)organises 
and (re)orders current political practice in these contexts10. Re-contextualization has been 
found, in one way or another, to be a constitutive aspect even of the alleged ‘grand’ ideologies 
of the twentieth century11 and needs, therefore, to be located in the heart of the concept of 
Ideology as such.   
If we understand ideology, as is proposed here, as a discursive practice of re-contextualization 
of symbolisms from the past, then, the ideological potential of mediatized political discourse 
is neither a priori impossible nor de facto possible; it rather becomes a matter of analysis of the 
generic and contextual aspects of mediatized politics. Do specific generic properties allow 
symbolisms from the past to emerge in media platforms, such as political advertising, which I 
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take as my empirical point of reference? Do these symbolisms hold any relevance to the 
historical itinerary of political institutions, such as political parties? Do re-contextualized 
symbolisms play any role in the current context, in respect of the challenges and opportunities 
the latter raises for the institutions, and how they perform this role discursively?  
These are questions to be put at the centre of the ideological analysis of mediatized politics, 
turning our attention from the out-of-touch grand narratives of mega-politics to the palpable 
practices of political communication as they are discursively enacted in different media genres 
and develop within different socio-institutional contexts. In the last part of this article, I will 
try to grapple with these questions by taking televised political advertising as an example of 
mediatized politics and examining its different generic rubrics, such as the ‘talking head’, 
‘man-in-the-street’ and ‘cinéma-vérité’ genres, within different institutional contexts – the 
American Democratic party (2008 presidential election), the British Conservative Party (2010 
general election) and the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) (2009 
parliamentary election), respectively.  
First, however, it is necessary to unpack the rather contestable neologism ‘mediatized politics’, 
especially in terms of the metamorphosis the concept of mediatization seems to imply for the 
very ontology of the ‘political’ itself. Arguably, as John Thompson has acutely noted12, ‘it is 
this mediazation […], rather than the alleged secularization and rationalization of social life, 
which should provide the principal frame of reference with regard to which the analysis of 
ideology is reconsidered today’.  
Mediatization as personalization, conversationalization and dramatization: unitary 
media logic or contextualised practices of media use?   
Technical means of inscription and dissemination of information have been an integral part of 
the management of politics, at least since medieval times, when European monarchs 
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extensively used woodcuts and engravings for their image-making13. However, the 
institutionally embedded and technologically advanced communication platforms, to which we 
refer when we talk about the media nowadays, are deployed in contemporary political 
communication not under the emperor’s doctrines or the ruling party’s will, as was the case up 
until the mid-twentieth century in many Western European countries (and as it still is in many 
other parts of the world),  but on the basis of media’s independent set of rules, norms and 
routines, what is loosely called ‘media logic’.14 As Meyer argues, ‘the rules of media logic 
recast the constitutive factors in political logic, in many cases by assigning them new shades 
of meaning and by adding to them new elements drawn from the media’s own set of laws’15. 
In the age of media’s institutional autonomy and technological advancement and 
sophistication, mediatization is, therefore, effectively taken to entail the colonization of 
political logic by the media logic16.  
Other than these media-centric developments, several socio-political processes, potentially 
related to, but by no means exhausted through the media, are also considered to have paved the 
way for the triumph of media logic. Among these processes is the growing ‘re-secularization’ 
and ‘managerialization’ of politics, in the postwar period, that is, the gradual disentanglement 
of the major political parties in Western democracies from the passionate ideational tensions 
and anchorages of the past (e.g. liberalism vs. conservatism or liberalism vs. communism) and 
their convergence toward a more or less moderate and pragmatist approach to politics that is 
immersed in the search for workable policies and electable party positions (e.g. Third Way 
politics)17.  
Re-secularization of politics is also fostered by the waning of class-cleavages which, 
inevitably, has deprived political parties of a solid base of support, and the constantly 
increasing disaffection of the electorate as a result of both the managerial turn of politics and 
the decline of ‘class politics’18. In such a destabilized and fluid socio-political terrain, the 
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argument goes, political parties are forced to resort to the media and adopt their logic so as to 
re-establish a channel of communication with the electorate, thereby effectively running their 
campaigns.19 Does, however, the need of political institutions to adapt to the media modus 
operandi necessarily produce the colonization of politics by a media logic?    
Let me answer this question by illustrating, first, what is usually considered to be this notorious 
media logic. When we refer to the media logic we mainly refer to some paradigmatic 
representational patterns through which media, conventionally, communicate politics to the 
wider public and which, are often argued to, have given rise to the three following interrelated 
trends: personalization, conversationalization and dramatization. Personalization is said to 
derive from the explicit preference of media’s grammar for personal figures as communicators 
of the political message instead of impersonal reports. Emphasis is put, particularly, on 
prominent actors’ (e.g. party leaders) personality features, such as honesty, humanity, 
friendliness but also decisiveness and competence, as components of the ‘mediatized political 
charisma’20. Closely related, the conversationalizing trend emanates from media proclivity to 
represent politics as a conversational routine, framed with phrases from the quotidian 
vocabulary in the form of sound-bites, providing, therefore, more space for an ‘episodic’ than 
a ‘thematic’ coverage of issues21. Finally, dramatization is attributed to media’s tendency to 
invest representation with a dramatic tone, highlighting conflictual, extravagant and grandiose 
aspects of events which, ultimately, construe politics as a spectacle22.          
Personalization, conversationalization and dramatization are trends detectable, more or less, in 
all the patterns through which politics is represented in different media platforms (news 
broadcasts, political advertising, political debates and interviews, etc.) and in practices through 
which the political is constructed as an identity and form of action beyond media platforms (in 
the way political actors frame their speeches in rallies, conventions, even closed-door caucuses 
and in the ways they professionally stage themselves when they are exposed in public venues). 
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In the age of mediatized politics, the former fuse into the latter traversing the whole ontology 
of politics. 
Undeniable as it may be that these trends dominate contemporary political communication, the 
theoretical choice to reduce them to a unitary media logic is not. First of all, the core essences 
of personalization, conversationalization and dramatization, that is, personal appeal, simplified 
rhetoric and dramatic style, respectively, had a prominent place in political rhetoric long before 
the emergence of mass media. As Jamieson has noted for the election campaigns in ‘Jefferson, 
Jackson or Lincoln’s time […] their messages were briefer […] than those of any sixty second 
spot ad. The air then was filled not with substantive disputes but with simplification, 
sloganeering and slander’23. Arguably, simplification and, by virtue of their simplifying 
aspects, personalization and dramatization are the means via which political rhetoric seeks to 
familiarize the public with processes and structures that are, otherwise, alien to and even 
unperceived by the latter24. 
Even if we accept the argument that the three aforementioned trends have been intensified and 
invested with different qualities in the age of mediatization25, the hypothesis of a single and 
unitary media logic that colonizes politics is still unsustainable. Not all these trends are ascribed 
the same qualities across different media formats and socio-institutional contexts. Sensational 
and dramatist framing of politics, for instance, has been reported to significantly vary between 
the tabloid press and the classic broadsheets26, as well as, personal appeals have been argued 
to find a more fertile ground in the social media than in the party official websites and forums27. 
On the other hand, the ‘raw materials’ out of which telegenic leadership is fashioned, for 
instance, are drawn on symbolic conventions and structures that are already salient in the 
political culture of each context, such as the Gaullist legacy of the heroic leader in the French 
right-wing UMP28. 
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These notes illustrate, if anything, that the three interrelated and interdependent trends of 
personalization, conversationalization and dramatization are neither more nor less than some 
abstract ‘ideographs’ or ‘ideotypes’ that acquire their particular meaning and qualities in 
concrete practices of political communication. Mediatized politics, therefore, is not politics 
colonized by a unitary media logic but politics performed through some conventionalised 
representational patterns (genres) which are informed by the practices of media use, embedded 
in specific socio-political milieus (contexts). 
Pragmatism and historicity in mediatized politics: the re-contextualizing principle of 
discourse  
One of the most debated political projects in the age of mediatization is the so-called ‘New 
Labour’ project in the UK, which emerged within the general euphoria around Third Way 
politics, as a pragmatically driven response to the socio-economic demands and challenges of 
the new, complex, highly interdependent and unpredictable world, beyond the dogmatic 
anchorages of neoliberalism and social democracy29. As Tony Blair, the man whose name has 
become synonymous with the New Labour project (Blairite politics), once put it ‘The 21st 
century will not be a battle around ideology. But it will be a struggle for progress. Guided not 
by dogmatic ideology but by pragmatic ideals’30. Blair and the other ‘pragmatists’ are right in 
arguing that in the age of diversification, multiculturalism, globalization and, I would add, 
mediatization, politics is not adhered to any specific belief system or grand narrative of the 
past. At the same time, however, the lack of consistency and historical determinism cannot be 
taken to amount to the eradication from new political projects of beliefs, ideas and other 
symbolic fragments of the past. This is something that neither Blair nor any other pragmatist 
politician would eagerly endorse.        
The New Labour project, for instance, within its market-oriented and highly personalized 
(Blairite) rhetoric, managed to rearticulate concepts of ‘justice’ and ‘equality’, inherited from 
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the party’s social democratic tradition, with the ‘self-development’ from classic liberalism, the 
‘equal worth’ and ‘cohesion’ from ethical socialism and communitarianism and the Thatcherite 
‘not rights without responsibilities’, among others31. What we politically experience in the age 
of mediatization, therefore, is more what Terdiman has called, a ‘heteroglot’32, that is, a hybrid 
or a hotchpotch of both pragmatic concerns and historical trends, reforming acts and 
sedimented myths, promotion of some interests at the expense of others, a sense of continuity 
and discontinuity, in the final analysis, than a unilateral disentanglement from the ideas and 
practices of the past. This hybridity, I argue, is not merely a strategic option of political actors 
(individual and collective) in order to broaden their popular base of support—what 
Kirchheimer33 has called ‘catchall’ party politics—but a cumulative effect of the historicity of 
political discourse itself. 
I take here historicity to grasp both the historically conditioned or, simply historical, nature of 
discourse, referred to by Kristeva as the ‘insertion of history into text’, and the historically 
constitutive or historicizing capacity of discourse, the ‘insertion of text into history’, in her 
terms34, and I see both these aspects imbricating within the re-contextualizing principle of 
discourse. By re-contextualization I mean the disarticulation and dis-embedding of concepts, 
ideas, discourses and practices from the socio-historical contexts in which they were originally 
produced and/or chronically reproduced, and their re-articulation and re-embedding into new 
contexts35. By virtue of its re-contextualizing principle, discourse carries with it the socio-
historical referents and implications of the de-contextualized practices (historical aspect) while, 
at the same time, by resituating the latter within new socio-institutional and, therewith, 
semantic contexts, it inevitably transforms their meaning (historicising aspect)36.   
Discourse appears, therefore, always to precede the emergence of specific institutional 
practices circumscribing the space within which individuals and groups can understand and 
self-define themselves as political subjects (identity-making), understand and define the 
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political reality within which they have to act (representation) and, eventually, understand and 
define the available means and ways of acting (action-mobilization)37. Arguably, such an 
approach to political discourse is primarily informed by post-structuralist discourse theory and, 
at this point, it is necessary to refer to the implications this raises for the attempted 
reconceptualization of ideology as re-contextualization.     
Post-structuralist discourse-political theory: towards an understanding of ideology as the 
re-contextualizing potential of mediatized politics 
The post-structuralist social theory of discourse takes as its point of departure the ‘radical 
contingency’, ongoing fluidity and complexity, that traverses late modern societies and comes 
to suggest that discourse, by ascribing a particular, relatively fixed, meaning, to concepts that 
are principally ‘empty signifiers’ (without any immanent meaning), gives rise to social 
practices through which the fluidity of the social is temporarily organized and ordered38. The 
discursive ordering of the social, however, if anything, mystifies the very condition of radical 
contingency that traverses the latter; discourse construes social relations as effectively fixated 
and consolidated while, in principle, they are open-ended and precarious. This ‘ontological 
misrecognition’ of social relations as givens in the regimes of meaning that discourse creates, 
crucially, differs from the Marxist ‘epistemological misrecognition’ of social relations as 
classless and eternal in the (false) consciousness of the working class; but it is still taken by 
discourse theorists (through a rather neo-Marxist/Gramscian prism) to establish and sustain the 
domination of a cluster of (class, gendered, nationalist, etc.) interests in the form of 
hegemony39. 
Political science, being rather hostile to post-structuralist discourse theory, has not yet 
systematically embarked on debates around re-contextualization and its relevance to the study 
of ideology, although there have been significant initiatives to this direction. Michael Freeden’s 
work on the ‘conceptual morphology’ of ideologies40 could be an exemplar in this regard. 
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Freeden espouses the post-structuralist principle of radical contingency, which he construes as 
inherent indeterminacy and contestability of political discourse, thereby rejecting the 
essentialist conception of ideology as a doctrinaire belief system. Quite the contrary, he argues 
that although concrete ideologies are usually treated and studied as set of ideas, ideology, in its 
conceptual generality, is the process of producing political ideas through the effective 
decontestation of political meaning. In other words, what in post-structuralist discourse theory 
described as the ordering capacity of discourse, Freeden perceives as ‘a wide-ranging structural 
arrangement ‘that attributes meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts’41 
without, however, ever resulting in a total decontestation of political discourse. 
From this point of view, ideologies may be seen as (discursive) formations, relatively open-
ended and porous in their boundaries (permeability), with their concepts acquiring meaning 
always in relation to other concepts that are closely linked to them42 or, as I would put it, in re-
contextualizing terms, in relation to the context within which they are resituated. Some of these 
concepts, Freeden suggests, are ‘core’ and, therefore, ineliminable and some others are 
‘adjacent’ and ‘peripheral’ and, therefore, subject to change (priority)43, a principle which 
reminds us that discourse by re-contextualizing ideas and practices, simultaneously, (re)orders 
and organises them. Finally, Freeden draws our attention to the fact that some concepts are 
allotted relatively more space than others in an ideology (proportionality)44. That is, crucially, 
a matter of inclusion and exclusion of certain socio-historical referents, and of their topical 
connotations, in the process of re-contextualization.    
Freeden, however, does not espouse the ‘Manichaeism’ of post-structuralist discourse theory 
to treat everything as discourse, and, therewith, the alleged capacity of discourse to establish a 
single and universal hegemony. He, instead, stresses that we need seriously to take into account 
the subjects’ agency over discourse45, that is, the instrumental use of discourse by political 
actors, as a means of pursuing their specific institutional interests and goals, in a variety of 
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different and unexpected ways that do not necessarily result in establishing and sustaining a 
hegemonic order46.  
Although I warmly defend Freeden’s scepticism about the concept of hegemony, I wish to 
argue that it is important to retain the critical element of discourse theory acknowledging that 
discourse, as already mentioned, through re-contextualizing ideas and practices, carries with it 
social-historical referents that are imbricated with (multiple and permeable rather than single 
and rigid) asymmetries and relations of domination, which subjects, regardless of whether they 
are aware of them or not, may serve and sustain while drawing on certain discursive 
formations47. As Michel Foucault has succinctly posed it ‘people know what they do; they 
frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do 
does’48. Consequently, ideology qua re-contextualization should be sensitive to both the 
instrumentalities (actor’s strategies and pursuits) and structuralities (social asymmetries and 
relations of domination) in the effective exercise of power and, most crucially, to their 
intersection – discourse may reproduce social asymmetries while being used by actors as a 
means of pursuing their goals and may serve or challenge social asymmetries in order to pursue 
actor’s goals.  
As we can conclude from the preceding discussion, the re-contextualizing principle, and its 
power-making implications is, crucially, a ‘tropism’ of political discourse in general and of 
media discourse in particular49;  it does not render, however, mediatized politics necessarily 
ideological. As we have seen, drawing on Freeden’s conceptual morphology, ideologies are 
characterised by some ineliminable core concepts of historical relevance to political institutions 
or other groups (not of concepts and ideas in general) and serve the exercise of power by these 
specific groups and institutions (not the power over society in general).  
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Consequently, as I wish to put it, mediatized discourse is ideological in so far as (a) it re-
contextualizes concepts which hold a symbolic meaning for a specific social group or institution 
(symbolisms), that is, concepts related by abstraction and convention to the historical itinerary 
of this group/institution, and (b) the performed re-contextualization of symbolisms serves the 
potential of this group/institution to enhance its relational position in a given social context, by 
justifying, for instance, its specific strategies and pursuits and/or by 
(de)legitimising/(de)mystifying specific asymmetries and relations of domination that are 
embedded in this context.     
Earlier on in this paper, I argued that mediatized politics is politics performed through some 
contextualised representational patterns in which the abstract trends of personalization, 
conversationalization and dramatization acquire their concrete meaning. By this token, the 
potential of these representational patterns to re-contextualize symbolisms from the past of a 
specific group/institution serving the effective exercise of power by this group/institution – the 
ideological potential of mediatized politics – is a matter of what Aristotle calls, ‘analytics’; not 
a matter of a ‘grand theory’ that can reject or accept this potential in advance50. It is, 
particularly, a matter of discourse analytics which focuses (a) on the genres, via which 
mediatized politics can be accessed as a concrete discursive practice, so as to detect whether, 
and in what ways, this practice encloses the re-contextualization of symbolisms and (b) on the 
context, in which mediatized politics is embedded as a concrete socio-institutional practice, so 
as to understand which symbolisms hold a historical relevance for a specific group or institution 
and what are the social differentials these symbolisms carry with them as well as the challenges 
this group or institution faces in the present.  
I shall focus on these analytical categories in greater length using some empirical examples 
from perhaps the most popular and widespread platform of political communication, televised 
14 
 
political advertising,51 and the one that offers us easy and ample access to the aforementioned 
dominant trends of representing politics in the age of mediatization52.  
The ideological potential of mediatized politics: some examples  
Generic and contextual options in the case-studies 
Genre is a widely recognisable, conventional pattern of representation, ‘[…] that is associated 
with and party enacts a socially ratified type of activity’53. The broadcasts54 chosen as examples 
in my inquiry draw on the three most commonly used in political advertising genres, which 
discursively instantiate into concrete practices (ratified type of activities) the three major 
(ideographic) trends in mediatized politics, introduced earlier, those of personalization, 
conversationalization and dramatization, respectively. More particularly, the spot by Barak 
Obama, The country I love, for the presidential election of 2008, constitutes a leader’s personal 
address to the electorate; a form of what Devlin calls talking head spot55, in which, customarily, 
the candidate/leader is presented as the most skilful and appropriate for the office and the one 
to be trusted. The electoral broadcast by the British Conservative Party, A new kind of 
government for Britain, for the General Election of 2010, relies instead on the ordinary voter 
so as to elicit support for the party and/or endorsement of the leader; the so-called man-in-the-
street genre56. Finally, in the spot by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Go!, for 
the Greek parliamentary election of 2009, the foci of attention is the enthusiastic interaction of 
people with the leader in real life settings, what has been referred as cinéma-vérité format57.  
It is important to note here that when I refer to discursive articulation or instantiation (of 
abstract trends into concrete practices) I mean the meaning-making potential of semiosis in its 
entirety; not only the purely linguistic material and the cognitive schemata it mobilises 
(Derridean logocentrism) but also, especially in the age of the multi-generic media discourse, 
the aesthetic and affective qualities of the ample audio-visual material (multimodality)58. As 
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Freeden has stressed, ideologies nowadays are more effectively disseminated through 
‘emotional visual symbols […] than rational argument’.59 Contra to the Enlightenment legacy 
which has, rather derogatively, relegated the emotive dynamic of aesthetics to the realm of 
political instincts, a bourgeoning sociology of emotions has highlighted the heuristic effect of 
affect on the very processes of cognition60. ‘Affect delimits the emotional potentialities of the 
image that orient us towards legitimate ways of feeling’61 and crucially, ‘the way we feel 
structures the way we think and ultimately the way we act’62.   
Context, in the way understood here, refers to a social site of interaction shaped by the routines, 
norms and internal logics that are traceable in its micro-genealogy63. I take here the American 
Democratic party as an example of an institutional setting situated in a context the genealogy 
of which is characterised by the absence of an aristocratic and feudalist ancient regime and, 
therefore, by the early establishment of a liberal democratic one, the basic principles of which 
have been espoused by both the two major political parties in the US64. I take the British 
Conservative party (also referred as ‘the Tories’), on the other hand, as an example of an 
institutional setting located in a more fragmented political context. This context has evolved 
out of the collapse of the ancient regime and the competing forces this collapse unleashed, that 
is, conservative forces, which have defended the idea of organic society and the return to 
traditional values, liberal forces, which have enshrined the ideas of individual freedom and 
self-development, and, later on, socialist and labour forces, which have stood for state 
protectionism, social justice and union rights65.  
Finally, I take Greek PASOK as an example of an institutional setting that is grounded in a 
context of, recently established, parliamentary democracy. This context has been shaped, 
primarily, by the historical traumas of a late civil war and junta and, more, particularly, by the 
polarization between some oppressive, militarist and anti-communist forces, identified with the 
‘evil Right’, and some oppressed, anti-Right and pro-communist forces (both without a clear 
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class structure), identified with the ‘resistant Left’66. These paradigmatically different 
genealogical characteristics, broadly sketched out above, have given rise to different practices, 
values and discourses that can be said to be of symbolic meaning for the parties whose political 
advertisements are examined here. Let me now illustrate what these symbolisms are and how 
they are related to the current pragmatic concerns of the three parties by discussing the ways 
they are re-contextualized in the aforementioned generic rubrics.  
Personalizing social values in the ‘liberal’ way    
Obama’s entire campaign for the 2008 presidential election was effectively built upon the two 
master frames of ‘hope’ and ‘change’, already inserted into the public debate, almost four years 
earlier, through his keynote speech to the Democratic National Convention, titled ‘The 
Audacity of Hope’67. In that particular TV commercial I examine here, in which Obama 
addresses the electorate as the Democratic candidate for the presidency, themes from that 
speech return, but hope as a driving force of change is downplayed. As Obama makes clear at 
the very beginning of his address – ‘I’m Barack Obama. America is a country of strong families 
and strong values. My life has been blessed of both’ – he would not talk about the audacious 
hope but about family and values, the bedrock of American nation.  
Obama refers to American values not in an abstract and didactic way but from his own personal 
experience throughout his life, a life that he describes as inextricably interwoven with these 
values. Description is both verbal – Obama explains how his life and, therefore, his personality 
have been shaped by the values of ‘accountability and self-reliance’, ‘love of country’, which 
refers to patriotism, ‘working hard without making excuses’, which also points to self-reliance 
and responsibility, and ‘treating your neighbour as you’d like to be treated’, which, apparently, 
refers to solidarity – and visual – pictures from his own life (e.g. as a baby in his mother’s arms, 
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as a law student and associate working for Chicago local communities, as a senator chatting 
with working people, the elderly and soldiers) authenticate what he says.  
As stressed so far in this paper, language and, hence, the multimodality of semiosis, do not 
have a mere referential function but a conceptually constitutive one. That commercial, by 
seeking to convince the viewer that Obama as president will be committed to and driven by 
America’s core values, construes certain social values as a personal lived experience. 
Accountability and self-reliance, for example, are reconstructed through Obama’s personal 
struggle to make ends meet as a student by taking several jobs and loans, and solidarity in his 
decision to reject Wall Street jobs to work, instead, for the devastated neighbourhoods of 
Chicago.  
As already noted, personalization in politics has often been deplored as an aesthetic technique 
that draws attention to personal appeals and differences countering the lack of consistent 
beliefs, values and vision68. In Obama’s case, however, personalization plays a role in the 
opposite direction, as we can see. It draws attention to Obama’s commitment to values and 
beliefs that a candidate like him—almost unknown before the primary contest and lacking the 
recognisability and support that party leaders in parliamentary regimes enjoy because of the 
strong hierarchical organisation and social penetration of their parties69—would not otherwise 
have been able to claim.  
By no means do these personalised values comprise a coherent and consistent belief system, 
but they do carry with them strong symbolic meanings. Accountability as a value, for instance, 
comes directly from the classic liberal principle of the rule of law, and self-reliance recalls the 
liberal insistence on the priority of individual freedom and self-development. Solidarity, on the 
other hand, which qualifies individual freedom with responsibility—also resonant in some 
streams of liberalism—echoes a motif of Christian ethics (‘treating your neighbour as you’d 
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like to be treated’) and communitarian ethos70. Finally, love of country touches directly upon 
the reigning symbol of American patriotism.  
This modicum of liberalism, of communitarianism, and of patriotism, albeit ambivalent and 
permeable as a discursive formation, holds its own relevance in the party’s history. It lies at the 
core of what Lakoff calls the ‘nurturant parent’ model; that is, a progressive way of thinking 
about family and the role of parents not as authoritarian discipliners of children but as guiders 
and assistants that enable their children to become autonomous and responsible citizens.71 
Lakoff argues that this model has structured liberal democratic thinking in the US, in the sense 
that the latter equally values freedom, which allows the pursuit of individual dreams, and 
responsibility and solidarity, which secure the national interest.   
Hope and change might have been Obama’s ‘Trojan Horse’ in the primaries but they were not 
enough to take him to the White House, especially in a context where ‘middle-of-the-road’ and 
moderate political projects are more resonant than the radical and erratic ones.72 Obama’s 
personal career, however, is by no means an exemplar of the ‘middle-of-the-road’ cliché; an 
African-American with Muslim name who had openly admitted experimentation with 
marijuana and cocaine, with Reverend Wright73 as his mentor, and who had an ambivalent 
position on the Iraq war and an openly pro-LGBD rights agenda as senator74.  
Hope, other than a politically powerful word, especially for progressive, democratic and left 
politics, is also an affective disposition on which Obama chiefly capitalize in this spot. Hope, 
in the political sociology of emotions, is considered a positive but moderate affective 
disposition; it does not mobilise voters to act in an immediate and impetuous way but 
encourages them, first, to favourably process information related to the candidate75. In this 
presidential spot, hope directs attention to the personalized discourse of social values and hence 
to the information that presents (legitimises) Obama as a man committed to classic and 
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diachronic values of the American democratic tradition so as to dispel the shadows of 
radicalism hovering over him. In doing so, hope is not related to change but to public 
reassurance.      
Conversationalizing Big Society in the ‘conservative’ way 
In the run-up to the British General Election of 2010, Conservatives under David Cameron’s 
leadership built their campaign upon the so-called ‘Big Society’ project, which, in the particular 
electoral broadcast examined here, acquires ‘flesh and bones’ in the narratives of three ordinary 
people (‘summarized’, in the end, as a single meta-narrative by the leader). Particularly, these 
lay narratives perform a double function in the broadcast, an iconic and a symbolic one. First, 
the three persons figure in this broadcast as ‘iconic’ characters in the sense that they are 
represented in such a way that highlights their ‘family resemblance’ to a known social subject 
(iconic meaning) rather than their particular physical similarities with a known individual 
(indexical meaning)76, that is, it highlights these characteristics that allow the viewer to 
recognise in these characters the three broader social categories that synthesise the Big Society: 
the hard-working mother, Julie; the welfare services volunteer, Daniel; and the responsible 
entrepreneur, Ian, rather than Julie, Daniel and Ian as individual personalities. Second, the 
option of the ‘ordinary person’ to deliver the party message has a symbolic meaning in the 
sense that it construes political participation as an everyday practice, open to and accessible by 
all, a practice that is not dominated by the jargon of party cadres and the alienating bureaucratic 
platforms of institutions but is open to the conversational routines of citizens.  
Crucially, conversationalization may end up simplifying and trivialising political discourse by 
‘inevitably butchering complexity and reducing politics to clever tricks’77. However, by 
opening up politics to lay persons, conversationalization may be argued to open up the party to 
society, and particularly in this case, a party that has been negatively identified with the wealthy 
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elites by a large part of society78. Does it mean that conversationalized Big Society drive Tories 
away from their conservative past? Not exactly.  
First of all, we can indeed detect the re-articulation of some cornerstone symbolisms in the 
party’s history, such as the prominence of family as a social unit (one of the ‘High Tory’ values) 
in Julie’s narrative, the self-reliant individual who does not ‘parasitize’ on the state, in Daniel’s 
narrative, and the free growing entrepreneurship, in Ian’s (key elements of the Thatcherite 
legacy), with a chain of connotations that draw upon libertarianism and communitarianism. A 
‘strong family’, for instance, is reconstructed, beyond a patriarchal frame, as a family in which 
the mother is ascribed an active and independent role (although Julie is married, her husband 
is absent from all the family activities represented in the broadcast) and children are the foci of 
care rather than discipline. Moreover, self-reliance is not associated with the Thatcherite 
opportunistic individualism (‘get on your bike’, buy your council house, become a share-
holder, make money in the end, etc.79) but with a spirit of solidarity exemplified by the 
voluntary help of people in welfare services (Daniel: ‘[…] you have to have a look of empathy 
and understanding […]’. Finally, a ‘new’ entrepreneurial profile emerges, that of the 
responsible entrepreneur, who cares about his employees apart from making profit (Ian: ‘I love 
running my own business [...] but it’s very tough sometimes, of course you take responsibility 
for the guys. You are one big happy family’). 
We could say that Cameronian ‘Big Society’ re-contextualizes symbolisms of the Conservative 
party, using the Blairite Third Way as a platform of re-contextualization rather than Thatcherite 
neo-conservatism and neoliberalism. But this interpretation still does not do justice to the 
conceptual promiscuity that characterises re-contextualization in this broadcast. Although the 
‘strength’ of family is re-evaluated in a libertarian frame, the symbolic form of ‘strong family’ 
as such is nostalgically represented as a lost ideal that can be retrieved through the return to 
traditional values (Julie: ‘I want the country to go back to where it used to be, where family 
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was important […]’), which is a trope par excellence of conservative political thinking.80 
Similarly, the communitarian connotations of public service may ameliorate the supreme 
individualism of self-reliance but, at the same time, the way it is re-contextualized prioritises 
self-organized communities of volunteers rather than state-subsidised/supported collective 
agency (Daniel: ‘I don’t see things as: there is a problem, there is a solution. For me there is 
always a man who can or a woman who can’). This implies that there is no need for greater 
governmental care (e.g. extension and improvement of the welfare and public services) - the 
‘liberal’ response of the protectionist left - but for greater social responsibility on the people’s 
side - the ‘conservative’ response of the neoliberal right81.  
As in the Obama spot, hope also emotionally permeates this Tory broadcast through the happy 
faces of the three characters and their optimistic view of the future. While, however, hope in 
Obama’s case encourages the viewer to seek more information about him in the narrative of 
his value-blessed life, in this case hope encourages the viewer to seek the information she needs 
about the Big Society in the narratives of three ordinary people, thereby shifting attention from 
the responsibility of the party-government to the responsibilities of civic society. In doing so, 
hope induces the viewer to consider responsible entrepreneurship, for instance, as a sufficient 
condition for the increase of employment and voluntary action for the protection of public 
welfare.  
Consequently, the conversationalized Big Society, on the one hand, seeks to popularise and 
humanise Tories by dispelling the shadow of the ‘nasty party’82 and, on the other hand, it seeks 
to dissimulate the limited role of government or, more particularly, its exclusive role in 
ensuring the freedom of market and in promoting public spending cuts (a neoliberal agenda), 
by presenting it as a transfer of political responsibility from government to the citizens 
(Cameron: ‘Real changes come not just from what politicians do but from what people do, what 
you do’)83. 
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Dramatizing Struggle in the ‘ethno-populist’ way 
Almost a year after Obama’s triumph, PASOK, the left-of-centre party founded in 1974 by 
Andreas Papandreou that dominated Greek politics throughout the post-dictatorship era, won 
a landslide under the leadership of Papandreou’s son, who also campaigned for ‘hope’ and 
‘change’. Although, however, in the case of Obama, these concepts were ‘discovered’ in his 
2004 speech on the ‘Audacity of Hope’, in the case of PASOK, they are deeply embedded in 
the ‘culture of resistance’, which flourished within the Left during the tumultuous post-war 
period as noted earlier, and which has marked the historical itinerary of the party since its 
outset.84 Gradually, as the historical traumas of the civil-war and junta faded away and the party 
started adapting to globalising and modernising imperatives, the culture of resistance 
degenerated into a vague, but still tremendously popular and influential, ethno-populist 
imaginary of resistance; an imagined resistance against anything and anyone that could be 
perceived as a threat to the national and popular sovereignty of Greeks85.   
In this ‘cinéma-vérité’ spot, hope and change are embodied once again in the imaginary of 
resistance, which is construed now, through the ‘gladiator metaphor’, as an awaited contest and 
a struggle (leader’s voiceover: ‘now it’s the time to struggle for Greece’; visual representation: 
Mr Papandreou enters a weightlifting stadium, crowded with people that applaud and cheer as 
they are waiting for him to reach the stand of the arena). Metaphors of conflict and battle are 
widely used in political rhetoric since, except for familiarising the public with complicated and 
abstract concepts, they impart a dramatic dimension to the narrative that aims at mobilising and 
polarising voters86. In particular, dramatization by stimulating enthusiasm, an emotional state 
more overwhelming than hope, invites the viewer to empathise with the represented subjects87; 
in this case, with the metaphorically represented struggle of the leader.  
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However, the leader’s voiceover, to which we listen as we watch him walking in the 
(backstage) corridors of the stadium before entering the arena, tells the viewer what to struggle 
for (‘release its [country’s] great potential, build a strong economy’ etc.) but not against 
whom. Arguably, this indeterminacy allows the viewer to project onto the otherwise vague 
imaginary of resistance the wrongdoings, asymmetries, logics and enemies against which s/he 
wishes to fight by voting for PASOK. At the same time, however, dramatized indeterminacy 
can be said to disorient people from the urgent fiscal problems,88 such as the substantially 
increased public debt and deficit of the Greek economy at that time, which could problematize 
the party’s ambitious programme of economic policy (i.e. increase in wages and pensions).  
As I have pointed out, indeterminacy and contingency in political discourse are not 
uncontrollable but managed through the decontesting and ordering conceptual effect of the re-
contextualization of symbolisms. How does the re-contextualization of the imaginary of 
resistance manage the indeterminacy around Papandreou’s call for struggle? The imaginary of 
resistance has so far been mentioned in the discourse of PASOK as constructing an enemy, 
usually external (the West, Europe or foreign forces in general) or internal (the Right, 
oligarchies or the ‘big interests’ in general) to the country89. In this broadcast there is no hint 
of an external national enemy, and the internal enemy that Papandreou demonised in his public 
speeches – the ‘evil Right’ and its corrupted governance – is absent too.  
Arguably, the affective disposition of enthusiasm, stimulated by the crowd’s warm welcome 
to the leader, invites, as already noted, the viewer to empathise with this ‘celebrative ritual’ 
rather than identify an enemy. Beyond the enthusiasm of the crowd, however, we can discern 
the fluctuating emotional state of the leader, revealed primarily by his facial expressions. 
Sometimes he looks happy and optimistic and sometimes troubled and uncertain as he gets 
ready to enter the stadium. This ‘backstage’ switch from hope to anxiety and vice versa 
24 
 
crucially disrupts the celebrative ritual that unfolds ‘frontstage’, begging for the viewer’s 
attention to (and reflection on) what really concerns the leader, that is, the structural 
inefficiencies of the Greek state (‘it needs work to make our state more efficient’), rather than 
the current fiscal problems, and, predominately, people’s eagerness to change themselves and 
abandon the practices that are related to these structural inefficiencies (‘to overcome ourselves 
and create the Greece we want’).  
The ‘enemy’ we are looking for is not easily spotted, therefore, since it does not lie somewhere 
‘out there’, on the ‘other side’, but inside our own social selves, for instance in the chronic 
pathogenies of clientelism (the extra-institutional distribution of benefits based on personal and 
party affiliations) and hedonism (the mentality in which prosperity is envisaged as an 
unconditional given lasting forever) that have occasionally been acknowledged by Papandreou 
and others within the progressive Left as the major causes for the inefficiency of the state and 
the inertia of civic society90.  
To sum up, the gladiator metaphor re-contextualizes the imaginary of resistance through two 
different dramatic motifs. The first dramatic motif is the enthusiast indeterminacy that re-
contextualizes the imaginary of resistance as an abstract ‘struggle for change’, which invites 
the viewer to empathise with the celebratory ritual of the forthcoming victory, thereby 
dissimulating current problems that would need urgent solutions (e.g. measures of austerity) 
after the election. The second dramatic motif is the switching dipole of hope and anxiety that 
re-contextualizes the imaginary of resistance as the ‘struggle to change ourselves’, which 
invites the viewer to reflect on, and thereby demystifying, chronic pathogenies that lie behind 
the current problems.  
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Conclusion  
In the age of mediatization, politics is widely moulded by the interrelated trends of 
personalization, conversationalization and dramatization, which, however, do not 
deterministically derive from any unitary media logic but they are ascribed different aesthetic 
and affective qualities within different, context-embedded, genres, thereby heightening and 
leveraging, or neglecting and downplaying, the historicity of political discourse. The images 
that narrate aspects of Obama’s life, for example, and on the basis of which we, as viewers, are 
invited to assess his moderation and patriotism (through the affective disposition of hope), 
personalize social values that can be traced in an imaginary (the ‘nurturant parent’) with strong 
roots in the American liberal democratic tradition.  
The ideological potential of mediatized politics, inextricably interrelated with the historicity of 
political discourse, needs therefore to be ‘disenchanted’; historicity does not mean cementation 
of political discourse with closed belief systems and coherent philosophic traditions but re-
contextualization of ‘fragments’, potentially antithetic and contradicting, from the past which 
hold a symbolic meaning for parties or groups. The three lay narratives that conversationalize 
the Big Society project, for example, re-contextualize several concepts with symbolic meaning 
for the Conservative party (strong family, self-reliance, growing entrepreneurship) in such a 
way that, on the one hand, the aspects which are related to the ‘nasty’ profile of the party 
(patriarchal remnants, individualism, deified profit-making) are ameliorated and, on the other, 
the conservative mentality (return to tradition, need for disciplined and responsible individuals 
rather than ‘nanny’ governments) is consolidated.   
If mediatization and its ramifications need to be taken seriously into account in the study of 
ideology, informing the reconceptualization of the latter as a re-contextualizing practice, 
ideology needs also to be taken seriously into account in the study of mediatized politics, 
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illustrating the ways power is effectively exercised through re-contextualization. PASOK, for 
example, the Greek left-of-centre party, contested an electoral victory in 2009 launching an 
ambitious and ‘extravagant’ manifesto that had to be legitimized against the government’s (and 
other national and foreign authorities’) assertion for the need of fiscal consolidation. As I 
showed, examining an electoral broadcast from that campaign, PASOK’s discourse claimed 
legitimacy through the re-contextualization of the ethno-populist imaginary of resistance as a 
dramatized struggle for eradicating chronic socio-political pathogenies (which are ‘revealed’ 
as the ‘real’ problems) rather than coping with the current economic exigencies (which are 
dissimulated).  
Ideology, inextricably imbricated with power-making, operates in the age of mediatized 
politics both in the cognitive and affective dynamics of the personalized, conversationalized 
and dramatized political discourse by re-contextualizing symbolisms from the past so as to 
mobilise (or demobilise) and legitimize (or delegitimize), inter alia, certain institutional 
actions, social asymmetries and relations of domination, in the present. What we as, researchers 
and analysts, need to do is constantly look for the different forms these dynamics take in 
different genres and contexts of mediatized politics.    
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